The first programmable logic controller (PLC) was the Modicon 084, developed in 1968–1969 by Dick Morley and Bedford Associates, and first commissioned in 1969 at General Motors’ Hydramatic Division in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Operational Technology environments were not originally designed with today’s cybersecurity landscape in mind. For decades, the primary objective was straightforward: keep the process running, keep people safe, and avoid making unnecessary changes to systems that are already working.
In many industrial environments, that philosophy still governs how OT systems are managed today.
There is nothing inherently wrong with being cautious around industrial control systems. In fact, “don’t touch what isn’t broken” has often been a sensible operational principle.
The first programmable logic controller (PLC) was the Modicon 084, developed in 1968–1969 by Dick Morley and Bedford Associates, and first commissioned in 1969 at General Motors’ Hydramatic Division in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Operational Technology environments were not originally designed with today’s cybersecurity landscape in mind. For decades, the primary objective was straightforward: keep the process running, keep people safe, and avoid making unnecessary changes to systems that are already working. In many industrial environments, that philosophy still governs how OT systems are managed today.
There is nothing inherently wrong with being cautious around industrial control systems. In fact, “don’t touch what isn’t broken” has often been a sensible operational principle.
The problem begins when that philosophy becomes an excuse for not questioning whether the environment is still appropriate for the risks it faces today. Industrial environments have changed dramatically. PLCs, DCS, SCADA systems, engineering workstations, historians, industrial networks, remote-access solutions, IIoT devices and enterprise systems are increasingly interconnected. What was once a relatively isolated control environment can now have multiple pathways to corporate networks, vendors, cloud platforms and external systems.
Yet cybersecurity practices often haven’t evolved at the same pace. This creates an uncomfortable situation: an OT environment can be operating reliably while simultaneously accumulating cybersecurity weaknesses, undocumented dependencies and outdated assumptions. And sometimes, the biggest warning sign isn’t a vulnerability. It’s negligence, limited knowledge, or simply the assumption that everything is fine because the plant is still running.
One of the most common mindsets I come across when discussing OT cybersecurity is, “We are not connected to the internet, so we are safe.” At first glance, this may sound reasonable. If a PLC or DCS network has no direct internet connection, it is certainly less exposed than a system sitting openly on the internet. However, treating internet isolation as a complete cybersecurity strategy creates a dangerous sense of security.
An OT environment does not need a direct internet connection to be exposed to cyber risk. Modern industrial environments have numerous pathways that can connect, directly or indirectly, to the control environment. Corporate networks, engineering workstations, vendor laptops, remote-access solutions, historians, IIoT gateways, wireless devices, removable media and third-party systems can all introduce potential pathways. In many cases, the PLC itself may never have internet access, while another system with access to the PLC network does.
This is why the more important question is not “Is our OT network connected to the internet?” but rather “What can connect to our OT environment?” A vendor laptop brought into the plant, a USB drive used to transfer a PLC program, an engineering workstation connected to multiple networks, or a remote-access mechanism established years ago can potentially create an attack path without the control system ever being directly connected to the internet.
The problem becomes even more significant when the belief in isolation leads to complacency. If an organization assumes that its OT environment is safe simply because it is not internet-facing, other cybersecurity practices can gradually become neglected. Vendor accounts may remain active long after they are needed, network connections may not be reviewed, legacy systems may never be assessed, removable media may be used without controls, and security monitoring may be considered unnecessary.
OT cybersecurity is an unusual discipline because it requires knowledge from two worlds that have historically operated separately: industrial automation and cybersecurity. A cybersecurity professional may understand firewalls, identity management, endpoint protection, vulnerability management and security monitoring extremely well, but that doesn’t automatically mean they understand the operational implications of modifying a DCS network, scanning a PLC environment, changing an industrial protocol configuration or disrupting communication between a controller and an engineering workstation.
Likewise, an experienced automation engineer may understand the process, PLC logic, DCS architecture and instrumentation exceptionally well, but may not have the expertise required to identify attack paths, evaluate network segmentation, assess authentication weaknesses, understand threat modelling or develop an OT incident-response strategy. The danger appears when an organization assumes that expertise in one domain automatically covers the other.
Statements such as “we have antivirus installed on the engineering workstation” can sound reassuring but it represents only one small piece of a much larger security picture. The real question is not whether a particular security control exists. It is whether the organization understands how the entire OT environment could be compromised, what an attacker could reach, and what the consequences could be.
This is one of the strongest reasons to conduct an independent OT security assessment. It provides an opportunity to challenge assumptions and bring together the perspectives of automation, IT, networking and cybersecurity rather than allowing each function to view the environment through its own limited lens.
Industrial environments accumulate history.
A firewall rule was created during commissioning and never removed. A vendor account was created for troubleshooting and remained active years after the project ended. An engineering laptop was kept connected because it contains software that is difficult to reinstall. A remote-access solution was implemented because a vendor needed to support the plant remotely. An old server was never replaced because nobody wanted to risk disrupting production. None of these decisions necessarily started as bad decisions. In many cases, they were perfectly reasonable decisions at the time.
The problem is that industrial systems can remain in service for decades, while the assumptions behind those decisions may become obsolete within a few years. This is where security negligence often becomes difficult to identify because nobody deliberately decided to create an insecure environment. Instead, small exceptions accumulate over time until they become part of the architecture.
Eventually, people stop asking why something exists.
They simply say:
“That’s how we’ve always done it.”
This mindset can be particularly dangerous in OT because reliability creates a powerful incentive not to change anything. If a system has been running successfully for ten years, there is understandable resistance to modifying it.
But stability and security are not the same thing. A security assessment provides an opportunity to revisit those historical decisions without assuming that everything must be changed. Some legacy configurations may still be perfectly justified. Others may represent risks that were never properly evaluated. The important part is knowing the difference.
One of the simplest ways to test an organization’s OT cybersecurity maturity is to ask a very basic question: “Can we explain everything connected to our OT environment?” The answer often becomes complicated very quickly.
The automation engineer understands the control system. The networking team understands the switches and firewalls, IT understands the servers. This is where organizational silos create cybersecurity blind spots. Each individual system may be understood reasonably well, while the relationships between those systems remain poorly understood.
A device that appears harmless in isolation can become significant because of what it communicates with. An engineering workstation may not look like a critical asset, but if it has access to multiple controllers, its compromise could have much greater consequences. A historian may not directly control a process, but it may provide a pathway between networks that were assumed to be separated.
The problem becomes even more serious when network diagrams, asset inventories and communication records are outdated. A diagram created five years ago may accurately represent what existed five years ago. It does not necessarily tell you what exists today.
If the organization cannot confidently answer what is connected, how it communicates, who can access it and why those connections exist, then it does not have complete visibility of its attack surface. And without visibility, cybersecurity becomes largely dependent on assumptions.
There is one sentence in OT cybersecurity that should always trigger a second question: “We’ve never had a problem.” The natural response should be: “How do you know?” A lack of incidents can certainly be reassuring, but it should never be treated as proof that an environment is secure. The difference lies in whether the organization has evidence of security or simply an absence of known problems.
If you say | The question to ask is |
We’ve never had an incident. | Has the environment actually been assessed? |
We have security controls. | Have those controls been tested? |
Our network is monitored. | Would we actually detect abnormal activity? |
Access is controlled. | Is access regularly reviewed? |
We have backups. | Have we successfully restored them? |
Our architecture is secure. | Has it been independently reviewed? |
Nothing has happened so far. | Or have we simply not noticed anything? |
This leads to a broader point about cybersecurity maturity: it starts with knowing what you don’t know. A security assessment provides an opportunity to replace assumptions with evidence, tribal knowledge with documented understanding, and uncertainty with a clear, risk-based roadmap. Before asking “How secure is our OT environment?”, perhaps the more important question is:
An Assessment Is Not an Admission of Failure
Muhammad Ali is an industrial engineering and digital transformation leader with 7+ years of experience across Engro, ICI, and Avanceon. He specialises in Industry 4.0/5.0, industrial automation, AI-driven solutions, and OT cybersecurity to enhance operational efficiency and resilience.
About Avanceon: Avanceon is a leading provider of industrial automation process control systems integration proprietary energy management solutions and support services. Avanceon has a strong global footprint with operations across the Middle East including the United Arab Emirates Qatar and Saudi Arabia as well as Southeast Asia and Australia.
With a legacy in the automation industry dating back to 1984 Avanceon has evolved into a 360-degree solutions provider delivering automation energy management service and maintenance solutions to major blue-chip companies. Avanceon is also listed in Control Engineering Magazine’s System Integrator Hall of Fame. Learn more at Avanceon
About ACET Solutions: ACET Solutions is a global operational technology (OT) cybersecurity company dedicated to protecting the industrial systems that power critical infrastructure worldwide. With decades of specialized experience and a team of certified engineers, ACET Solutions delivers end-to-end OT security services, from governance and risk assessments to technical implementation and managed security operations, across sectors including oil & gas, electrical and utilities, water, petrochemicals, marine and ports, mining, healthcare, and manufacturing. Learn more at ACET Solutions
Quick Links